Introduction
On the face of it all is clear and simple. In order to feed over 9 billion people by the year 2050 much more research and technological development (R&D) and investment will be necessary. 1 As late as 2008, the World Bank lamented a decade-old neglect of under-investment and a decreasing relative share of technical assistance, including in its own projects, and encouraged greater investment to address food security concerns. 2 Attracting such investment is important in food deficit countries that experience low relative yields for their agricultural production. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 3 can play a crucial role because it can mean that the right quantities reach food deficit areas at the right moment. 4 Unsurprisingly, such governments are interested in more investment. A plethora of guarantees and incentives for FDI are offered, often going far beyond what states' own nationals can expect. However, FDI is not always the answer to food security problems. In reality it can be very much a two-edge DRAFT FOR SIEL (SINGAPORE 12-14 JULY 2012) NOT FOR QUOTE OR COPY Comments by 31 August 2012 are welcome.
3 be made aware of their rights. 9 Likewise, although the investor's home state may act extraterritorially to regulate the investor's behaviour within the host state, this intervention is only undertaken under specific conditions and is never automatic. 10 Such action will also not necessarily promote the host state's food security obligations, but may be undertaken to promote different objectives important to the investor's home state, like the enforcement of stronger labour rights, for example.
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The paper is in three sections. First we will set out the positive effects agricultural FDI can have even in weak states together with a determination of how such FDI might also adversely affect their food security. Second, we will analyse the system of multilevel governance covering agricultural FDI at both the pre-investment and post-establishment stage, in particular highlighting that the different hard and soft law rights and duties on the investor, the host state and (where relevant) the investor's home state. 12 In this section, we will show how this multilevel governance leads to over protection and under regulation of the investor to the detriment of the host state's food security. In the final section we will set out a proposal for a 'public interest' clause to be inserted into the BIT to benefit the host state. It is our belief that this clause will help to ameliorate the imbalance between the over protection and under regulation of agricultural FDI that we identify in the second section.
The Effects of Agricultural FDI in Weak States
FDI can promote global food security directly if it leads to a net-increase in productivity and/or the production of food crops. It is certainly true that in many countries there is ample land available for such cultivation. According to World Bank estimates, in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia only 12 % of arable land is currently cultivated. 13 Rather surprisingly, this 12 Our focus is on regional and international regulation and so the hosts state's domestic legal system will only be discussed to the extent that it is relevant to this analysis. For more detail on problems in domestic legal systems see generally Rising Global Interest in Farmland above n9. In this article we argue that the soft law obligations are weaker instruments. is the case even in China. 14 The consequences for the host state (the state in which the investment is made) on its food security of FDI are varied however.
Some studies show that the host state is unlikely to be able to rely on the food produced by the investor to meet its own direct domestic food security needs, as most of the food is exported.
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For example, Saudi Star Agricultural Development plc acquired 200,000 thousand hectares of prime arable land in Ethiopia in 2009 on which to grow cereals. All cereals grown on the land were intended for export to Saudi Arabia. Whilst this will no doubt support Saudi Arabia's food security requirements, inevitably the food itself will not reach the citizens of Ethiopia.
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The impact on a host state's food security can even be negative, as cash crop exports can substitute local food production. This happens if local farmers are illegally displaced as a result of the purchase (or expropriation), or long-term lease of large portions of their agricultural land on which they previously grew crops, or where their cattle previously grazed. These are the so-called 'land grab' cases. 17 Domestic agricultural production then can cease completely, or may be substantially reduced. 18 The remaining portions of land following acquisition may be so small that it is no longer economic for the local producers to cultivate the land even if they are permitted to do so by the investor. 19 Displacement may also occur because the local producer can earn more money as, for example, a security guard, than he could as a farmer.
20
Former (individual or communal) landowners themselves will be more food insecure if they can no longer work their (leased) land, or get adequate compensation or new jobs.
21
Some commentators also argue that further negative pressure on food security for the host state also occurs as large-scale FDI in food exports and fuel crops increases pressure on water supplies for neighbouring food croppers with the consequence that the investment is in reality 14 The Economist, 3 December 2011. 15 Note that we mean the food itself is exported. However, there may be indirect benefit to food security. This is discussed below infra. 16 The host state's food security may in fact derive some indirect benefit from the investment.
27
In general, FDI helps reverse the trend towards chronic underinvestment in agriculture in many sub-Saharan African states that was highlighted by the World Bank. 28 Countries like Tanzania, Sudan and Zambia, for example, tried to kick-start their own domestic agricultural production in order to support their citizens' food security needs. A lack of public funding, coupled with poor technology and management of the large farms, saw these initiatives fail.
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Carefully managed foreign investment could enable up to 6 million hectares of additional agricultural land to be cultivated by 2030. 30 This rise in agricultural FDI is also important for the host state, as the investor will at least provide foreign exchange and tax revenues (like any traditional cash crop exports such as coffee and bananas, or biofuels), which that state can use to buy food on the global market, or, in some cases re-invest in increasing food crop produc- tion. 31 Local producers may also enter into partnership agreements or production contracts with an investor, for instance for crops like sugar cane and oilseeds. Production of these crops, in particular, benefit from the local producers' cultivation knowledge together with capital and technology from the investor.
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The key to gaining these positive benefits from FDI in agriculture is good management of the various projects to ensure the host state derives maximum benefit for all their development needs, without the detrimental effects on their food security. Such management will be greatly facilitated if robust 'hard' law underpins it. Although this would be the ideal position, the reality is less optimistic for weak states.
How are the key FDI challenges to Food Security currently regulated?
A complex web of over 3,000 bilateral investment treaties (BIT) and regional trade agreements (RTA) promote and protect agricultural FDI against a number of risks, including expropriation. This system of regulation often offers greater guarantees for foreign investors against expropriation, easier access to courts and enhanced compensation possibilities than domestic investors enjoy. 33 At first glance it appears that this regulation provides comprehensive control over agricultural FDI. In reality that regulation places stringent obligations on the host state vis-à-vis the investor through international and regional treaties, as well as the BIT, but under-regulates the investor in two ways: first, it can prevent policy reforms, for instance for better labour or environmental protection ("regulatory chill"). 34 Secondly, as will be seen below it may even undermine the host state's food security obligations. This over-protection and under-regulation of agricultural FDI manifests itself in different ways at the pre-investment and post-establishment stages. The PRAI too were described in the Discussion Note prepared by the FAO, IFAD, the United Nations and the World Bank as, at best, "a toolkit of best practices, guidelines, governance frameworks and possibly codes of practice." 51 There is a move towards creating a model law, in which the PRAI would be enshrined, but this is only outlined in the third project under the Action Plan, and even then, it is only scheduled to be a discussion point. 52 Even if the PRAI were contained in a model law, the normative power of such instruments is inevitably limited. Although it appears that the obligation on the host state to invite agro-FDI that improves, or at least does not impinge on food security is only enshrined in soft law, it is underpinned by duties that states owe to their citizens in international and regional human rights law: specifically, the right to food and the right of indigenous peoples to use their land and exploit natural resources on that land for the purposes of feeding themselves. 57 Whilst some commentators
a. Pre-Investment Stage
have questioned the precise nature of these rights' normativity, it is clear that they are much closer to 'hard law' for the purposes of this analysis.
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The right to food in international human rights law requires that "each individual alone or in community with others, have physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement." 59 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in General Comment 12, has further interpreted Article 11 to mean that food must be available in sufficient quantities and be of sufficient quality that it satisfies the dietary needs of individuals. So, the food available must be culturally appropriate and sufficiently nutritious, in terms of adequate calorie content and safety, so that the individual thrives both medically and physically.
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In addition, food must be accessible in ways that are sustainable and yet do not interfere with other human rights. 61 Accessibility is understood in terms of both physical and economic accessibility. In other words, it must be possible either for the individual to feed themselves directly by working on productive land, (understood as an individual right to invest and produce The right to food has also been incorporated into regional initiatives. As most weak states we refer to in this paper are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, the most important regional initiative is the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 68 The unique nature of the Charter means that an individual's human rights are to be fully realised only in the context of their community as a whole. 69 Nondiscrimination between individuals and peoples is therefore central to the ACHPR's concept of economic, social and political rights.
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Moving the focus to the community and away from the individual means that the right to food is understood to be a collective right for the host state's population as a whole as part of its overall economic development strategy. 71 Article 14 also specifically recognises the "right to
property" which would potentially protect any local producers that did have some form of land tenure. However, it is possible for the state to encroach on this right if it is in the interest of the wider community, although such encroachment must be undertaken in accordance with national law and provided affected citizens would be effectively compensated for their loss.
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Article 17 equally provides for respect for cultural ways of life and traditional ways of life, including agricultural production methods. Although the guidelines are in draft form, it is clear that they are an extension of human rights obligations already on the state.
In essence, the instruments discussed so far suggest that the host state has an active obligation to only encourage agro-FDI that will actively add to that state's food security. This obligation is not enforceable as 'hard law' in its own right, but is supported by human rights obligations in international law and regional initiatives that map on to at least some elements of the obligation to promote food security in the context of agro-FDI, which are enforceable. 77 Consequently, the host state could be held accountable by its citizens and other states should it condone agro-FDI that does violate these rights. This places a heavy burden on the host state at the pre-investment stage in terms of the type of FDI it should attract, or refuse. The question to which we now turn is whether the same burden also falls on the investor's home state and the investor itself.
Food Security, FDI and the Investor
At the pre-investment stage, there is very little hard law governing the behaviour of the investor. To the extent that the investor is a wholly private entity with its own commercial strategy, international investment law has nothing to say about the way it chooses how and where to invest. Even the concept of good faith only works against the host state. For example, if the investor has been promised inducements to invest, it will be held to deliver on those induce- 14 investment law is certainly not designed to compel the investor to consider the impact of its investment on the host state's food security before it makes the investment decision.
The underlying assumption in foreign investment law is rather that all parties are able to freely negotiate the terms of the investment. The resulting investment therefore represents the compromise between the competing pros and cons of the investment. 79 In other words, the very nature of FDI is thought to be positive for all parties and the law is merely the legal underpinning of this mutual benefit. The only hard law limitation may be that the investor cannot invest in a way that breaches domestic law. 80 The extent to which this helps weak states combat the problems of agro-FDI at the pre-investment stage is questionable.
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The only potential constraint on the investor to invest in ways that do not undermine the host state's food security is through soft law. Principle 2 of the PRAI states that any investment
should not jeopardise the host state's food security. 82 This principle is primarily aimed at the host state, but it is also implicit in Principle 2 that the investor acts in a way that does not undermine the food security of the host state. Principle 5 places a specific commitment on the investor to ensure any project it is about to enter into respects the host state's "rule of law, industry best practice" and results in "durable shared value." 83 Clearly this is a commitment that is meant to cross into the post-investment stage too, but inevitably the investor is supposed to be under a minimum obligation to check that its planned investment does not violate this commitment.
Agro-FDI projects should be assessed by the investor for their technical and economic viability, prior to the investment. 84 Due diligence all along the supply chain from the investment to the consumer should be undertaken by the investor before the investment takes place to check for possible impact on the hosts state's food security, its citizens' right to food and violations MNCs, these obligations can be 'enforced' through dispute settlement proceedings in the EPA. 96 There are detailed provisions in the EPA for the possibility of consultations in the event of a dispute, arbitration and, ultimately, the withdrawal of any offending measure.
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Whilst this is clearly an important breakthrough in the creation of 'hard law' to ensure FDI does not undermine food security, in reality, the EPA does not specifically address the key concerns of agro-FDI that we set out in section 2 above. Instead, there is a general commitment to address agriculture in later negotiations. 
b. Post-Establishment Stage
It is clear from the discussion in section 2 above that many of the problems associated with agro-FDI mainly occur after the investment contract has been concluded and the investment project is being implemented. This is often the point where local producers are displaced and local land tenure rights ignored as land is cleared for the investor, water rights are being violated, and promises to strengthen infrastructure by the investor fail to materialise and the activities of the investor start to impact adversely on the host state's food security and the human rights of its citizens.
Obligations on the Host State
At the post-establishment stage, the host state is still under an 'obligation' to pursue a food security policy that supports the right to food, land tenure rights and the rights of its indigenous peoples despite the activities of the investor. 99 The problem is that the host state's ability to force the investor to run its investment in ways that do not violate those rights is greatly weakened by the under regulation and over protection of the investor. All the obligations on the investor to undertake the investment in accordance with the host state's food security (and human right to food, property and indigenous peoples' rights) are contained in soft law; whereas all the obligations on the host state to protect the investor are contained in hard law in the BIT, regional and international investment law. 95 Ibid., Article 49(2) 96 Ibid. Chapter IV. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. Article 53(f). 99 The hard law/soft law nature of these commitments is discussed above in section 3 infra.
E.g. Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food
Security, above n 55, para 4.
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After investment, foreign investment law assumes that the balance of power shifts from the investor to the host state because the host state retains the sovereign right to change the law, or act in such a way that the investment becomes economically non-viable for the investor.
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Model BITs, regional and international investment law work on the assumption that it is critical that the investor is protected from such violations. 101 If the host state wishes to act postinvestment to re-instate some limited land tenure rights, promote greater use of partnerships between the investor and local producers, or impose caps on 'blue' water usage for irrigation, this will be regarded as a violation of the investor's rights. 102 Some case law, especially in NAFTA and the 2012 revision of the US Model BIT, does seem to be showing some amelioration of this investor-bias, but the 'hard law' in this field will still make it very difficult for the host state to require the investor to respect its food security post-investment. Several problems arise.
On investment, the investor has the right to 'fair and equitable' treatment of its investment:
that is, "investments shall 'at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory' of the reciprocating host state." 103 This obligation on the host state is divided into two main categories: a general obligation to fair and equitable treatment and full protection throughout the period of the investment; and a general right to non-discrimination both in terms of national treatment and most favoured nation (MFN) treatment. For agro-FDI post-investment, the specific fair and equitable treatment standard and the national treatment obligation are the most important. 104 These standards have been developed through individual arbitration decisions in BIT and regional arbitration proceedings, although questions remain whether these standards are sufficiently ingrained to reach the status of customary international law. 105 The consequence is that the full scope of these obligations is decided on a case-by-case basis, usually under the relevant BIT or regional treaty 100 L. Cotula: Human Rights, Natural Resources and Investment in a Globalized World, (2012) Routledge, 62-73. 101 On the general incidence of BITs in Sub-Saharan Africa and a detailed study of their terms see Cotula ibid. 102 On the scope of these problems see section 2 above infra. The host state cannot act in a way which impedes the investor's specific right to fair and equitable treatment of its investment. In model BITs, this is often expressed as a duty not to "in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use or enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory of nationals or companies" of the investor. 106 The 2012 US model BIT states this to be a "minimum standard of treatment of aliens" consistent with the US' obligations in relation to diplomatic protection in general public international law. 107 For the US therefore, this provision is one of due process only: the investor should expect to have access to civil, criminal and administrative proceedings if the terms of its investment are altered post-investment, but the duty does not extend further than that. Other arbitral tribunals have interpreted it to be a higher standard in the context of other BITs.
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What is "fair and equitable treatment" must be addressed on a case-by-case basis, but in essence, when the host state is trying to re-orient the investment back towards its own food security goals, it must not act in a way that could be regarded as arbitrary. 109 This is understood to be an overall obligation to act in good faith in a way that "does not affect the basic expectations" that the investor could legitimately have when making the investment. 110 It encompasses not going back on any contractual or regulatory promises made to the investor at the pre-investment stage; a duty to fully reveal any rules and obligations in national law before the investment takes place and also an obligation on the host state to guarantee the contractual rights of the investor. 111 The tribunals' focus is on whether there is a stable environment for the investor in the host state, and not whether the investor is, or is not complying with human rights per se.
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Whilst the host state might think about readjusting its BIT (to the extent it has the negotiating power to do so) to insist the investor comply with human rights, the difficulty is that if the state has not done this before the investment (or simply been unable to do this), then after investment, this may be regarded as a breach of the BIT possibly entitling the investor to compensation. 113 BITs often contain umbrella clauses which guarantee the rights in the BIT and stabilisation clauses too that bind the investor and the host state to the domestic law as it stands at the time of the investment. 114 Unless the right to food and land tenure rights are fully enshrined in national law therefore, this will be problematic for the host state. Displaced local producers cannot bring the claim themselves. The tribunal too is not under an obligation to consider other areas of law, like the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rightsarguably with the possible exception of jus cogens. In this case, the tribunal could find a (narrow or broad) conflict between the host state's human rights obligations to its local producers and indigenous land rights' holders with the terms of the BIT, and then allow the human rights obligations as jus cogens to trump the host state's obligations to the investor under the BIT. To the extent of the conflict, the terms of the BIT would be void.
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As part of the overall obligation to accord the investor 'fair and equitable' treatment of their investment in general, many BITs include specific national treatment provisions. Under these terms, the host state is required to "accord treatment no less favourable than that which the host state accords to its own investors." 116 The requirement is therefore not to treat agroinvestors any differently to the state's own investors. The national treatment obligation only applies once the FDI is established.
This provision is difficult for weak states in the context of food security. Our discussion above in section 2 shows that FDI may cause problems for food security that can be traced to the sheer size of the investment being made. There is no hard and fast rule here, but in weak states it may be that there are very few local sources of investment that can even make a contribution to the state's food security. This means that the basis of comparison for the purposes 113 Ibid.,, para 184.
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of assessing whether the investor is accorded national treatment can be difficult. Tribunals have taken an expansive approach too to precisely who the equivalent 'national' comparator investor is.
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In Occidental v Ecuador, the equivalent 'national' investor was held to be all local producers of the similar product; a potentially very wide category for agricultural production. This interpretation clearly creates problems too if most local production is undertaken by small-scale production and/or by indigenous peoples, and it is precisely their collective right to invest in food production as part of their right to food that the host state is trying to protect. Inevitably, the investor will be treated differently in such circumstances, even if the legislation designed to protect the human rights of its citizens might be phrased in a non-discriminatory way on its face.
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In SD Myers v Canada, a NAFTA panel stated that it might be possible to take the overall objectives of the treaty into consideration when determining whether the investor had been treated differently. 119 The panel pointed to the fact that NAFTA contains clauses that require that investment should not be undertaken in a way that violates social (i.e. labour standards) and environmental concerns. Should the host state take action against the investor in those cases, the panel thought this would be sufficient to push the investor into a different category to that of the domestic producer for the purposes of determining national treatment. 120 It could follow that if there is a clause in the BIT that provides specifically for different levels of protection on the basis of 'public interest,' this may be sufficient to justify the different treatment, but only if the tribunal is minded to follow the same line as the NAFTA panel. However, the precise circumstances where this differentiation can be justified, is as yet uncertain.
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Changes to the terms of the investment once it has been made are likely to amount to an expropriation of the investors' assets. el production. Alternatively, expropriation can occur indirectly when, for example, the state decides to require the investor to enter into producer partnerships, insurance schemes, or local content purchasing requirements of the type endorsed by PRAI, after the investment has been made. 122 Indirect expropriation can be found through gradual accretion of legalisation that works to remove the rights of the investor over time to the point where the investor's control over the investment is effectively neutralised. 123 The critical point seems to be when the investor has been "substantially deprived" of the economic value of the investment as a matter of fact, taking into account the duration and level of the deprivation. 124 In direct and indirect expropriation, the host state has the sovereign right to expropriate the investment, but it must do so in a way that accords with general rules of international law and any specific terms of the regional treaty or the BIT. In general, any expropriation must be non-discriminatory, for a public purpose and be undertaken in accordance with due process.
125
These criteria are cumulative. 126 It is clear that the state has very wide discretion regarding what is deemed to be a 'public purpose,' which could include expropriation on human rights grounds, or even, preventing the investor exporting crucial biofuel on food security grounds.
However, the host state must actually show that the expropriation is for that public purpose; it is not enough merely for them to say that it is.
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The expropriation also cannot be for purely political reasons because the host state has now decided to protect some groups of producers and not others, but instead needs to have some legal (objective) justification. 128 If the tribunal finds that expropriation has occurred, then the host state is required to pay compensation to the investor that is 'prompt, effective and adequate.' 129 Under BITs, it is still uncertain whether a "full" compensation is due for both legitimate and illegitimate expropriation, or whether only illegitimate expropriation requires greater compensation. 130 There is a sense that if the hosts state's activities can be said to "regulatory," then it will not amount to expropriation. 131 The key considerations appear to be the degree to which the investor's rights are interfered with. Taking back tracks of land from the investor to give back to local producers would fall into the category of expropriation as it completely neutralises the value of the investment. Adjusting the terms of the investment to take into consideration some of the issues in the PRAI may be said to be regulatory, especially if the readjustment does not 'enrich' the producer, but neutralises the balance of power between the investor and those producers.
Regulation is something that an investor is said to be able to "reasonably expect" when deciding whether or not to invest. 132 Arguably, a host state deciding to implement international human rights obligations within its territory should be something that any legitimate investor would, or at least, should expect. Interestingly, the 2012 US Model BIT specifically states, "non-discriminatory actions…that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives…do not constitute indirect expropriations." 133 It is unclear how tribunals will interpret the scope of this obligation, but it does at least appear to cover the instance where the host state legislates to further guarantee the human rights of its citizens.
The Investor's Rights and Obligations
Even with the gradual easing of the strictures on what constitutes a breach of the BIT requiring the host state to compensate the investor, it is still clear that there is a heavy bias in favour of protecting the investor's rights in hard law. By contrast, the obligations on the investor to not undermine the host state's citizens' right to food, and land tenure rights, and the host state's food security generally is all contained in soft law. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises also places positive obligations on agroinvestors who are also multinational corporations (MNCs) to respect the human rights of any local producers and indigenous peoples affected by their activities.
138 Agro-investor MNCs should also "encourage local capacity building," by working closely with the local community; should maximise local employment opportunities; should not push for loopholes in the BIT to protect themselves from domestic human rights legislation and should introduce their own monitoring systems to check they are adhering to the guidelines. 139 All of which mirror the general exhortation on all investors in the PRAI. MNCs should also have their own policy on human rights, which should include how they plan to address human rights violations and how they carry out their activities in ways which does not infringe human rights. MNCs must also carry out "human rights due diligence" along the entire supply chain. 140 The MNC's human rights policy should go beyond the legal duty to respect the human rights of the local producers that may be contained in the domestic law of the host state, and instead ensure the MNC fully complies with internationally recognised human rights' obligations.
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The policy should be approved at the highest level of the organisation; made public; 'operationalized' throughout all the MNC's policies and specifically stipulate that all the MNC's employees will respect the human rights of those affected by the investment. 
Conclusions
For one, we consider that no government can have a legitimate interest in protecting investments violating human rights, social or environmental norms, or the right to food. When such cases come to the limelight -often prompted by NGO action and local media -many governments are bound to first act on the case and, in a second step, consider regulatory changes.
The changes required should have positive effects on food security and not be merely reflex reactions to the immediate problem. We argue that changes are required at both the pre- In addition to general capacity building at the post-investment, the host state should be encouraged to adopt a public interest clause in its BIT and regional trade agreements. Such a clause would transform the general 'soft law' exhortation on the investor to be a 'good citizen' into 'hard law. Commitments undertaken by the investor to build roads etc. as part of the investment, as well as to ensure its investment did not violate the host state's citizens' right to food and land tenure rights could be enforced through the terms of the clause. As we showed above, it may even be that failure to adhere to the terms of this clause will not amount to an expropriation requiring the payment of appropriate compensation for the purposes of international investment law. We set out our proposal for such a 'public interest' clause below:
Public Interest
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed (1) Such measures should not be applied in a manner that would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or investment.
(2) Such measures shall be applied in good faith and in a non-discriminatory manner between investors.
(3) Adequate and fair compensation would be provided to the investors of the other Contracting Party for all actions taken in full compliance with the investment agreement entered into by the competent and duly authorised local or national authorities.
